Acceptance, Belief, and Commitment

Newton C. A. da Costa and Steven French

in Science and Partial Truth

Published in print November 2003 | ISBN: 9780195156515
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199785896 | DOI:

Series: Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science

 						Acceptance, Belief, and Commitment

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The focus on the models or, more generally, the structures in which sentences are satisfied encourages a shift to a broadly representational and nonpropositional account of the objects of belief. The consequences of such a move have yet to be fully explored in this context. This chapter sets out a possible doxastic framework for understanding this shift in epistemic attention. It draws on Sperber's account of the difference between “factual” and “representational” beliefs, where the object of the latter is a “semipropositional” representation of incomplete conceptual content. It is argued that the fundamental idea behind this notion can be conveniently grasped in terms of partial structures: a “representational” belief that p is then understood as a belief that p is partially true only, whereas a factual belief that p is a belief that p is true in the correspondence sense.

Keywords: nonpropositional account; Sperber; objects of belief; doxastic framework; factual belief; representational belief

Chapter.  12273 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science

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