Chapter

Quasi Truth and the Nature of Induction

Newton C. A. da Costa and Steven French

in Science and Partial Truth

Published in print November 2003 | ISBN: 9780195156515
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199785896 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019515651X.003.0008

Series: Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science

 						Quasi Truth and the Nature of Induction

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This chapter considers the “vertical” relationship between theory and evidence. In particular, it considers the impact of the conception of “partial” truth on the dynamics of belief change. A new basis for a logic of induction is developed which is faithful to the central principles of induction as set down by Russell, and which can handle various well-known problems that are taken to beset standard Bayesian approaches. It is shown that the standard, but implausible, assumption of “logical omniscience” can be appropriately weakened through a formal modification of the notion of “quasi truth”.

Keywords: Russell; logical omniscience; evidence; partial truth; belief change; inductive argument

Chapter.  14710 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science

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