Chapter

How Socrates Can Make Both Pleasure and Virtue the Chief Good

George Rudebusch

in Socrates, Pleasure, and Value

Published in print November 2002 | ISBN: 9780195159615
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199869367 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195159616.003.0010
 How Socrates Can Make Both Pleasure and Virtue the Chief Good

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The Socrates of early Platonic dialogs defends both the following claims about human good: (i) Pleasure is the good (in the Protagoras); (ii) Virtue is the good (in the Apology and Crito). I reconcile these claims by showing how Socrates can identify virtuous activity with pleasant activity for a human being. The key is to interpret pleasure as modal, not sensate.

Keywords: happiness; hedonism; human good; Plato; pleasure; Socrates; virtue; virtue supremacism

Chapter.  2088 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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