The Problem of Diminished Control

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print October 2003 | ISBN: 9780195159875
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780199835010 | DOI:
 The Problem of Diminished Control

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This chapter examines the charge that the indeterminism required by standard event-causal libertarian accounts would diminish the control that is exercised in acting. The objection has been advanced with an ensurance argument and an argument from luck. Both arguments are rejected; nondeterministic causation of an action by its immediate causal antecedents need not diminish at all the type of control relevant to free action. This chapter further assesses the account of free will advanced by Robert Kane, which imposes certain special requirements meant to address the problem of diminished control. These special requirements provide no help; but, in any case, none is needed.

Keywords: action; control; diminished control; event-causal libertarian accounts; free action; free will; indeterminism; Robert Kane; luck; nondeterministic causation

Chapter.  12302 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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