Chapter

The Problem of Value

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print October 2003 | ISBN: 9780195159875
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780199835010 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019515987X.003.0006
 The Problem of Value

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Here I examine the charge that the indeterminism required by event-causal accounts is at best superfluous; if free will is incompatible with determinism, then, it is said, no event-causal libertarian account adequately characterizes free will. The distinction between broad incompatibilism and merely narrow incompatibilism is brought to bear. If the latter thesis is correct, then an event-causal account can secure all that is needed for free will. However, if broad incompatibilism is correct, then no event-causal account is adequate, though such views can still secure some things of value that cannot exist given determinism, such as distinctive types of difference-making and attributability, and the truth of the presumption of open alternatives that we commonly make while deliberating.

Keywords: attributability; control; deliberation; event-causal libertarian accounts; difference-making; free will; incompatibilism; indeterminism; open alternatives; value

Chapter.  13857 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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