Chapter

The Freedom of Decisions and Other Actions

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print October 2003 | ISBN: 9780195159875
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780199835010 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019515987X.003.0007
 The Freedom of Decisions and Other Actions

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Libertarian accounts commonly hold that only certain acts of will, such as decisions (or choices), can be directly free, with the freedom of actions of other types—whether mental or overt, bodily actions—deriving from that of these acts of will. Here this willist view of freedom is rejected in favor of an actionist view. Event-causal libertarian accounts (and agent-causal accounts that employ an event-causal theory of action) can do as good a job of characterizing the freedom of actions other than decisions as they can in the case of decisions.

Keywords: act of will; action; agent-causal libertarian accounts; causal theory of action; choice; decision; event-causal libertarian accounts; free action; mental action; overt action; will

Chapter.  7296 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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