Chapter

An Integrated Agent‐Causal Account

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print October 2003 | ISBN: 9780195159875
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780199835010 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019515987X.003.0008
 An Integrated Agent‐Causal Account

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This chapter begins an assessment of agent-causal libertarian accounts, which require causation by agents, where this is construed as causation by enduring substances and not reducible to event causation. Timothy O’Connor’s agent-causal view is examined. Like most such accounts, it does not require, in any case of acting freely, that events such as the agent’s having certain reasons cause the event that the agent is required to directly cause; the view consequently fails to provide for the reason-explanation of free actions. An alternative agent-causal account is advanced, one that integrates agent causation (as a requirement for free action) with an event-causal theory of action.

Keywords: action; agent-causal libertarian accounts; agent causation; causal theory of action; free action; integrated agent-causal account; Timothy O’Connor; reason-explanation

Chapter.  8950 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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