Agent Causation and Control

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print October 2003 | ISBN: 9780195159875
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780199835010 | DOI:
 Agent Causation and Control

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Agent-causal accounts aim to secure greater control than can be secured by any event-causal libertarian account. Assuming that all it requires is possible, an integrated agent-causal view succeeds at this goal and adequately characterizes free will. Such a view captures well the common idea that free agents are originators of their free actions. Responses are offered to Peter van Inwagen’s challenge to agent-causal views and to Galen Strawson’s argument that free will is impossible. A claim that free will requires downward causation—of a sort involving the supersession of microlevel laws—is rejected.

Keywords: agent-causal libertarian accounts; agent causation; control; downward causation; free action; free will; origination; Galen Strawson; Peter van Inwagen

Chapter.  18017 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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