The Troubles with Standard Analytic Epistemology

Michael A Bishop and J. D. Trout

in Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment

Published in print January 2005 | ISBN: 9780195162295
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780199835539 | DOI:
 The Troubles with Standard Analytic Epistemology

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This chapter compares the authors' naturalistic approach to epistemology to that of SAE. It is argued that the theories of SAE are structurally analogous to the naturalistic approach — they have at their core a descriptive theory, and from that descriptive theory, proponents of SAE draw normative, epistemological prescriptions. The prospects for the theories of SAE overcoming the is-ought gap are not good. The chapter also argues for the superiority of Strategic Reliabilism over any extant theory of Standard Analytic Epistemology.

Keywords: naturalistic approach; descriptive theory; SAE; is-ought gap; Strategic Reliabilism

Chapter.  5996 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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