Chapter

Deception, Self, and Self–Deception in Philosophy

Robert C. Solomon

in The Joy of Philosophy

Published in print May 2003 | ISBN: 9780195165401
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199870103 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195165403.003.0009
Deception, Self, and Self–Deception in Philosophy

Show Summary Details

Preview

Philosophers have always condemned lying, but in philosophy, the telling of falsehoods is far more common and far more accepted than usually acknowledged. Plato defended ”the noble lie,” and the ultrarespectable English ethicist Henry Sidgwick suggested that a ”high‐minded lie might do us all a good deal of good.” Nietzsche challenged, ”Why must we have truth at any cost anyway?” The threatening nature of the truth has long been whitewashed by philosophers. Self‐deception is of particular interest, but it is not simply the application of deception to oneself. It is deception about rather than to oneself.

Keywords: deception; Nietzsche; philosophy; Plato; self; self‐deception; Sidgwick

Chapter.  9472 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.