The Range of Leibnizian Compatibilism

Eric Sotnak

in New Essays on the Rationalists

Published in print February 2003 | ISBN: 9780195165418
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780199868285 | DOI:
The Range of Leibnizian Compatibilism

Show Summary Details


“The Range of Leibnizian Compatibilism” Leibniz is generally regarded as a compatibilist, holding that an individual can be determined and also act freely (or have free will). However, some Leibnizian texts suggest that perhaps Leibniz also had incompatibilist tendencies; in particular, Leibniz could not entirely give up the thesis that free individuals must have the ability to act in ways other than they actually do. I identify several varieties of deterministic threat to freedom and examine Leibniz's views with respect to them. Leibniz must find room in his metaphysics for compatibilism not only with respect to human freedom, but also for divine freedom. There are asymmetries in his accounts of human and divine freedom that make it easier for Leibniz to accommodate compatibilism for God than for humans.

Keywords: compatibilism; compatibilist; free will; freedom; God; Leibniz; metaphysics; Eric Sotnak

Chapter.  13093 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.