Chapter

The Agrippan Argument and Two Forms of Skepticism

Michael Williams

in Pyrrhonian Skepticism

Published in print August 2004 | ISBN: 9780195169720
Published online May 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786343 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195169727.003.0007
 The Agrippan Argument and Two Forms of Skepticism

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This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a contextualist picture of justification. Contextualism is said to incorporate the best features of its traditionalist rivals — foundationalism and coherentism — and also to avoid skepticism. It is argued that we should not ask which conception is really true, but instead give up epistemological realism.

Keywords: Pyrrhonian skepticism; regress; Prior Grounding; Default and Challenge; foundationalism; coherentism; contextualism; epistemological realism

Chapter.  10628 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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