Chapter

Applications to Game Theory

Paul Weirich

in Realistic Decision Theory

Published in print August 2004 | ISBN: 9780195171259
Published online November 2004 | e-ISBN: 9780199834976 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019517125X.003.0009
 Applications to Game Theory

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An agent in a game of strategy often has a preference ranking of options without a stable top. Strategic reasoning leads the players to a profile of strategies that are jointly self-supporting. Such a strategic equilibrium is not always a Nash equilibrium, but every Nash equilibrium is a strategic equilibrium. In a game with multiple strategic equilibria, principles of comprehensive rationality select an equilibrium that is Pareto optimal among strategic equilibria. The strategies forming the equilibrium are jointly rational and so constitute a solution of the game. The chapter’s appendix reviews Skryms’s account of joint deliberational equilibrium.

Keywords: deliberational equilibrium; joint rationality; Nash equilibrium; Pareto optimal equilibrium; selection of an equilibrium; Skyrms; solution of a game; strategic equilibrium; strategic reasoning

Chapter.  11436 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

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