Chapter

 Chasing Duhem

P. Kyle Stanford

in Exceeding Our Grasp

Published in print May 2006 | ISBN: 9780195174083
Published online May 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786367 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195174089.003.0002
  Chasing Duhem

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Nearly a century ago, French physicist Pierre Duhem offered a characteristically lucid and provocative articulation of the challenge to the power of scientific methods to uncover theoretical truths about the natural world. What seems to have worried Duhem is the eliminative character of many important scientific inferences: often in science, perhaps even typically, we arrive at a decision to accept or believe a given theory because we take ourselves to have convincingly eliminated or discredited any and all of its proposed rivals or competing explanations of the available evidence. But as Duhem saw, such an eliminative inferential procedure will only guide us to the truth about nature if the truth is among these competitors in the first place. It is argued that eliminative inferences are only reliable when we can be reasonably sure that we have considered all of the most likely, plausible, or reasonable alternatives before we proceed to eliminate all but one of them (or, in the limiting case, simply rest content with the lone contender). But the history of science shows that we have repeatedly failed to conceive of (and therefore consider) alternatives to our best theories that were both well confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently plausible as to be later accepted by actual scientific communities. The historical record suggests that in science we are typically unable to exhaust the space of likely, plausible, or reasonable candidate theoretical explanations for a given set of phenomena before proceeding to eliminate all but a single contender, but this is just what would be required for such eliminative inferences to be reliable.

Keywords: eliminative inferences; Pierre Duhem; scientific methods; scientific inferences; pessimism

Chapter.  11755 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science

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