Moral Judgments

Bernard Gert

in Morality

Published in print February 2005 | ISBN: 9780195176896
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780199835300 | DOI:
 Moral Judgments

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This chapter examines several linguistic theories of moral judgments, and shows that none of them is able to distinguish between moral judgments and non-moral judgments. It uses the distinction between moral standards and responsibility standards to clarify the difference between praise and condemnation, which are related to the former, and blame and credit, which are related to the latter. It shows that the phrases, morally good, morally bad, morally right, morally wrong, and morally ought are not redundant, and differ in meaning from good, bad, right, wrong, and ought.

Keywords: moral judgments; moral standards; responsibility standards; praise; blame; credit; good; right; wrong

Chapter.  16289 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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