Are Moral Beliefs Truth‐Apt?

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

in Moral Skepticisms

Published in print February 2006 | ISBN: 9780195187724
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786121 | DOI:
 Are Moral Beliefs Truth‐Apt?

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This chapter discusses expressivism as a form of moral skepticism that denies the truth-aptness of moral beliefs and judgments. It focuses on whether expressivists can solve the problem of embedding (also known as the Frege problem) by allowing that some moral beliefs have a minimal kind of truth, and whether expressivists can account for the apparent objectivity of moral beliefs. It concludes that if expressivists succeed in mimicking all apparently realistic moral language, then expressivism does not really matter to moral epistemology.

Keywords: expressivism; moral realism; truth; truth-aptness; objectivity; embedding; Frege problem; Blackburn; Gibbard

Chapter.  8495 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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