Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

in Moral Skepticisms

Published in print February 2006 | ISBN: 9780195187724
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786121 | DOI:

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This chapter surveys traditional responses to the skeptical regress problem for justified moral belief. It looks at naturalism, which attempts to derive “ought” from “is” or, more precisely, to formulate a deductively valid argument from non-normative premises to a moral conclusion. An example from Nelson is discussed, and it is shown that this argument, though logically valid, cannot be used to solve the skeptical regress problem.

Keywords: naturalism; the is/ought problem; necessary moral truths; validity; formal validity; Hume; Thomson; Nelson

Chapter.  8698 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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