Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

in Moral Skepticisms

Published in print February 2006 | ISBN: 9780195187724
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786121 | DOI:

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This chapter criticizes moral intuitionism, which claims that some moral beliefs are justified independently of any ability to infer them from other beliefs. It defines moral intuitionism, and argues that beliefs need confirmation when they are partial, controversial, emotional, or formed in circumstances that are conducive to illusion or unreliability. Empirical research is cited to show that moral beliefs are subject to these problems and, hence, need confirmation by some inference, so moral intuitionism cannot solve the skeptical regress problem.

Keywords: moral intuitionism; reliabilism; externalism; disagreement; partiality; emotion; heuristic; illusion; Audi; Horowitz

Chapter.  19755 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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