Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

in Moral Skepticisms

Published in print February 2006 | ISBN: 9780195187724
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786121 | DOI:

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This chapter explains moral coherentism as the view that some moral beliefs are justified by virtue of cohering with a system of belief that is coherent in the sense that it is consistent, connected, and comprehensive. Second-order beliefs about reliability are introduced to handle standard objections to coherentism. It concludes that coherence can make some moral beliefs justified out of a modest contrast class, but not out of an extreme contrast class with moral nihilism. This final chapter, together with the rest of Part 2, thus leads to moderate moral skepticism.

Keywords: coherentism; coherence; consistency; connectedness; comprehensiveness; reflective equilibrium; Sayre-McCord; Brink

Chapter.  17160 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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