Chapter

 Objections and Replies

David B. Wong

in Natural Moralities

Published in print August 2006 | ISBN: 9780195305395
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786657 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195305396.003.0003
  Objections and Replies

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This chapter responds to the following objections against pluralistic relativism: it is unable to explain moral disagreement; it undermines confidence in one’s moral commitments; it makes learning from other cultures impossible; the notion of “local” criteria of adequacy for moralities cannot be regarded as criteria at all; it is not a form of relativism but rather a form of pluralism simpliciter; there is nothing like the fixed human nature presupposed in the argument for it; the functional conception of morality is biased toward consequentialist moralities.

Keywords: confidence; consequentialist; human nature; other cultures; local criteria; moral disagreement; pluralism

Chapter.  18262 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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