Chapter

 Error from Ignorance

Daniel Stoljar

in Ignorance and Imagination

Published in print July 2006 | ISBN: 9780195306583
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786619 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195306589.003.0004

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

  Error from Ignorance

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This chapter takes up the conditional thesis that if the ignorance hypothesis is true, the logical problem is solved. The defense of this thesis begins from the idea that there are a number of distinctive ways that a modal argument can go wrong — a number of standard mistakes. The philosophical challenge presented by the modal arguments that are constitutive of the logical problem is that it is hard to see in these cases that we are making any of these standard mistakes. On the other hand, if the ignorance hypothesis is true, it becomes immediately plausible to suppose that we are making one of (or a combination of) these mistakes. This suggests in turn that E1 is true: if the ignorance hypothesis is true, the logical problem is solved.

Keywords: modal arguments; standard mistakes; ignorance hypothesis; moths and the beams

Chapter.  9738 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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