Chapter

 General Plausibility

Daniel Stoljar

in Ignorance and Imagination

Published in print July 2006 | ISBN: 9780195306583
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786619 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195306589.003.0005

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

  General Plausibility

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The next three chapters turn from E1 to E2, and discuss the case for believing the ignorance hypothesis in the first place. This chapter starts by emphasizing our ignorance in general, our ignorance of experience in particular, the way in which the assumption of ignorance explains a philosophical predicament that otherwise remains elusive, and the way in which the ignorance hypothesis is suggested by the basic structure of the logical problem. The epistemic view is also compared and contrasted with McGinn’s mysterianism.

Keywords: mysterianism; empirical ignorance; logic; experience

Chapter.  9337 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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