Chapter

 Objections and Replies

Daniel Stoljar

in Ignorance and Imagination

Published in print July 2006 | ISBN: 9780195306583
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786619 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195306589.003.0008

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

  Objections and Replies

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Two objections to the epistemic view are addressed. According to the first, the epistemic view is mistaken because if the problem at issue is understood correctly, we are in possession of the relevant truths. According to the second, the epistemic view is mistaken because it has a range of alarming side effects, some of which have been suggested by proponents of the view themselves. These objections raise important questions, but it is suggested that reflection on them strengthens, rather than weakens, the epistemic view.

Keywords: structure; function; intrinsic properties; objectivity; perceptual availability

Chapter.  14607 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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