Chapter

 A Posteriori Entailment

Daniel Stoljar

in Ignorance and Imagination

Published in print July 2006 | ISBN: 9780195306583
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786619 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195306589.003.0009

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

  A Posteriori Entailment

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This chapter presents the view that the supervenience of the experiential on the non-experiential is irreducibly a posteriori — the a posteriori entailment view. The main problem for this view emerges when we notice that Kripke, the philosopher who did most to make it prominent, also considered and rejected it. The lesson of Kripke’s discussion on this point is that the mere idea of a posteriori entailment does not solve the problem of experience, and therefore that a proponent of the a posteriori entailment view is obliged to add further material. On the other hand, an examination of what this further material might be yields the result that either the a posteriori entailment view has no answer to the arguments, or else collapses into the epistemic view.

Keywords: necessary a posteriori; Kripke; conceivability; possibility

Chapter.  11368 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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