Daniel Stoljar

in Ignorance and Imagination

Published in print July 2006 | ISBN: 9780195306583
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780199786619 | DOI:

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series


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The main position to be defended and debated in this book — called “the epistemic view” — can be stated by first formulating a hypothesis about our epistemic situation that the author calls “the ignorance hypothesis”, which says that we are ignorant of a type of non-experiential truth relevant to the nature of experience. In the light of this hypothesis, the epistemic view says, first that if the ignorance hypothesis is true, the problem of experience or consciousness is solved, and, second, that the view is true. The reader is also introduced to the example of the slugs and tiles — the main aid to thought in the book.

Keywords: epistemic view; ignorance hypothesis; problem of experience; slugs; slugists; conceivability argument; knowledge argument

Chapter.  5278 words. 

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