Chapter

The Number of Agents: Entry, Barriers to Entry and Collusion

Jean J. Gabszewicz

in Strategic Interaction and Markets

Published in print January 2000 | ISBN: 9780198233411
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191596292 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198233418.003.0003
The Number of Agents: Entry, Barriers to Entry and Collusion

Show Summary Details

Preview

Examines how the market solution is affected when the assumption of a large number of buyers and sellers is relaxed. After analysing market contexts involving a very small number of strategic agents (monopoly and duopoly), we consider the consequences of entry on the market solution when entry barriers are absent. Then we extend the analysis to the case when incumbent firms anticipate the entry of potential competitors. Finally, the effects of collusion are analysed at the end of this chapter.

Keywords: collusion; duopoly; entry; limit pricing; monopoly

Chapter.  7764 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Microeconomics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.