Chapter

The Independence and Distinctness of the Personal Point of View

Samuel Scheffler

in The Rejection of Consequentialism

Published in print August 1994 | ISBN: 9780198235118
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598340 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198235119.003.0003

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

The Independence and Distinctness of the Personal Point of View

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Explores the considerations underlying an agent‐centred prerogative and the considerations underlying a distribution‐sensitive conception of the good. Scheffler argues that, whether or not the integrity‐based objection to consequentialism succeeds, that objection nevertheless reveals a principled rationale for an agent‐centred prerogative: the prerogative is a rational strategy for taking into account the independence of the personal point of view. (Scheffler calls this strategy the ‘liberation strategy’, and he contrasts it with a ‘maximization strategy’, which tries to accommodate the personal point of view within the framework of a sophisticated consequentialism.) The personal point of view and the distinctness of persons also provide a principled rationale for favouring distribution‐sensitive conceptions of the overall good.

Keywords: agent‐centred prerogative; consequentialism; distribution sensitive; integrity; liberation strategy; maximization strategy; personal point of view; principled rationale

Chapter.  15139 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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