Chapter

The Project Reconsidered

Samuel Scheffler

in The Rejection of Consequentialism

Published in print August 1994 | ISBN: 9780198235118
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598340 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198235119.003.0005

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

The Project Reconsidered

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Defenders of agent‐centred restrictions might respond to the arguments of Ch. 4 by questioning the whole enterprise of trying to find a principled rationale for agent‐centred restrictions. Specifically, they might argue that the very idea of ranking states of affairs is flawed, and thus no rationale is required for agent‐centred restrictions. Scheffler responds that the idea of ranking states of affairs is not misguided, and that even if it were, there would still be a basis for questioning the rationality of agent‐centred restrictions. Along these same lines, Scheffler maintains that the search for a rationale for agent‐centred restrictions does not reflect an antecedent bias in favour of consequentialism. It is much easier, he argues, to find a rationale for an agent‐centred prerogative than for agent‐centred restrictions.

Keywords: agent‐centred prerogative; agent‐centred restriction; consequentialism; principled rationale; states of affairs

Chapter.  5625 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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