Chapter

Completeness and Compresence: Owen on the Argument from Relatives

Gail Fine

in On Ideas

Published in print August 1995 | ISBN: 9780198235491
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597398 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198235496.003.0011
Completeness and Compresence: Owen on the Argument from Relatives

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Fine's account of the Argument from Relatives differs very much from that of G.E.L. Owen's account in his ‘A proof in the Peri Idēon’. In this chapter, Fine explores in more detail Owen's account, and the points on which they disagree. Fine argues that the Argument from Relatives assumes that the possibility of knowledge requires non‐homonymous properties, and that Plato shares the assumption that F‐ness can only be explained if there is some one thing F that is the same in all cases. Fine's conclusion reinforces that of Ch. 10, i.e. that neither Plato nor the Argument from Relatives posit forms for semantic reasons.

Keywords: Argument from Relatives; non‐homonymous properties; G.E.L. Owen; possibility of knowledge; semantic reasons

Chapter.  5231 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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