Aristotle's Objections to the Argument from Relatives

Gail Fine

in On Ideas

Published in print August 1995 | ISBN: 9780198235491
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597398 | DOI:
Aristotle's Objections to the Argument from Relatives

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Aristotle initially raises three objections to the Argument from Relatives; Fine points to a fourth objection that Aristotle raises later in the text, and she examines all four in this chapter. Aristotle's first objection, of which Ch. 12 is a preliminary discussion, is that no substance is a relative; the second so that there is a conflict between self‐predication and uniqueness; the third is that the Argument from Relatives establishes two forms of the unequal; and the fourth is that all forms are relatives. Fine argues that these objections are natural and valid, but that Plato is not necessarily committed to the Argument from Relatives. This raises a familiar difficulty concerning Aristotle's interpretation of Plato; again Fine argues that while Plato may not intend the conclusions that Aristotle objects to, Aristotle does not misinterpret Plato, rather he simply reads him literally.

Keywords: forms; relatives; self‐predication; substance; the unequal; uniqueness

Chapter.  6996 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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