Chapter

The Accurate One Over Many Argument

Gail Fine

in On Ideas

Published in print August 1995 | ISBN: 9780198235491
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597398 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198235496.003.0014
The Accurate One Over Many Argument

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Fine argues that this One over Many Argument is different from the one already discussed in Ch. 10. It differs in that it is a valid argument for the existence of forms and also in that the premises lead to the Third Man Argument; neither point is true of the earlier One over Many Argument. In fact, Fine argues, if the distinctions between the two One over Many Arguments are not properly clarified, then one would have difficulty in understanding the logic of the Third Man Argument. This is because, whereas the Accurate One over Many argument posits some one thing, F, over groups of F things, and not just sensible particulars, the earlier One over Many argument posits some one thing, F, over groups of sensible particulars only. The Accurate One over Many argument is therefore a more generalized version of the earlier One over Many argument; this difference is crucial to the Third Man Argument.

Keywords: forms; One over Many Argument; sensible particulars; Third Man Argument

Chapter.  3040 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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