Chapter

Mathematical Knowledge and Reliable Authority

C. A. J. Coady

in Testimony

Published in print October 1994 | ISBN: 9780198235514
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597220 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198235518.003.0014
Mathematical Knowledge and Reliable Authority

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There is a common view that mathematical truths can be known only a priori, by intuition or grasping a proof, but the possibility of transmitting mathematical knowledge by testimony cuts against this view. This chapter discusses the tension between the common view and the realities of testimonial knowledge. It examines the attempts to show that mathematical knowledge cannot be conveyed by telling, and argues that they are unsuccessful.

Keywords: anti‐realism; a priori; Chisholm; impersonal knowledge; intuition; knowledge; mathematical knowledge; paradox; proof; understanding; Bernard Williams

Chapter.  6489 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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