Chapter

Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft)

M. F. Burnyeat

in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima

Published in print November 1995 | ISBN: 9780198236009
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598104 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019823600X.003.0003
 Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft)

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This essay argues that the Putnam-Nussbaum thesis that modern functionalism is Aristotelian is false. It fails as an interpretation of Aristotle since it fails to notice that Aristotle’s conception of the material or physical side of the soul-body relation is one which no modern functionalist could share. The Putnam-Nussbaum thesis is examined within the context of the theory of perception. This involves the need to understand one of the most mysterious Aristotelian doctrines – the doctrine that in perception, the sense-organ assumes the sensible form of the object perceived without its matter.

Keywords: Aristotle; De Anima; mind; soul-body relation; functionalism; perception

Chapter.  6731 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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