Chapter

Changing Aristotle's Mind

Martha C. Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam

in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima

Published in print November 1995 | ISBN: 9780198236009
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598104 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019823600X.003.0004
 Changing Aristotle's Mind

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This essay is a response to Myles Burnyeat’s paper that attacks an interpretation of the credibility and acceptability of Aristotle’s views of the body and soul. It begins with a discussion of Aristotle’s motivating problems. An interpretation is defended against Burnyeat, which distinguishes Aristotle from both materialist reductionism, and from the Burnyeat interpretation that perceiving etc. does not require concomitant material change, and that awareness is primitive. Aristotle’s position is then defended as tenable, even in the context of a modern theory of matter.

Keywords: Aristotle; body; soul; theory of matter; Myles Burnyeat; De Anima

Chapter.  16814 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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