Chapter

On Aristotle's Conception of the Soul <sup>*</sup>

Michael Frede

in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima

Published in print November 1995 | ISBN: 9780198236009
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598104 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019823600X.003.0007
 On Aristotle's Conception of the Soul *

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This essay explores Aristotle’s conception of the soul. Aristotle believes that natural objects and their behaviour cannot be fully understood in terms of their material constituents and their properties, but have to be explained in terms of their essence or nature. Souls are simply a particular kind of essence or nature, namely the essence or nature of animal bodies. Doing justice to physical or natural phenomena requires the notion of a form or nature. Once this notion is allowed, it is strong enough to account for all that one would want a soul to account for – life, the things living objects do, and even the so-called affections of the soul.

Keywords: Aristotle; soul; essence; De Anima

Chapter.  8710 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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