Chapter

Dialectic, Motion, and Perception: <i>De Anima</i> Book 1

Charlotte Witt

in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima

Published in print November 1995 | ISBN: 9780198236009
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598104 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019823600X.003.0011
 Dialectic, Motion, and Perception: De Anima Book 1

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Book 1 of Aristotle’s De Anima extensively discusses two characteristics of the soul: the soul as the source of motion of the living being, and the soul as the seat of perception and cognition. The following conclusions are drawn on the nature and function of the soul. The soul is not a magnitude and not material; it is a substance and not an attribute; it is a unity, and the principle of unity is not material continuity. The soul is the origin of perception and motion, and of psychological processes such as emotions and desires. An adequate account of how the soul causes perception, motion, and the like must not attribute motion to the soul.

Keywords: De Anima; Aristotle; soul; motion; perception; cognition; dialectic

Chapter.  8399 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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