Chapter

What Does the Appeal to Use Do for the Theory of Meaning?

Michael Dummett

in The Seas of Language

Published in print February 1996 | ISBN: 9780198236214
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597350 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198236212.003.0004
What Does the Appeal to Use Do for the Theory of Meaning?

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Wittgenstein's notion of use, occurring in the slogan ’meaning is use’, comprised anything that could be counted as belonging to the rôle of the sentence in the language‐game. It included not only the communicatory function of an utterance of the sentence itself but also of an utterance of a complex sentence of which it was a constituent. This makes any feature of our linguistic practice that relates to the sentence affect its meaning. The source of this view lies in rejecting the Fregean distinction between sense and force.

Keywords: assertion; Frege; meaning; sense; truth; use; Wittgenstein

Chapter.  6215 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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