Michael Dummett

in The Seas of Language

Published in print February 1996 | ISBN: 9780198236214
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597350 | DOI:

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Frege saw existence as a second‐level concept and ascribed it to first‐level concepts, rather than to individual objects. Frege's solution encounters difficulties with the statements involving either empty proper names or modal locutions. A modification of Frege's account is possible if Quine's proposal for transforming statements containing proper names into statements with quantifiers and predicates. It is further argued that Kripke's account of negative existentials is untenable, whilst Evans's insistence that all information‐linked terms can be understood just in case they have reference is misguided.

Keywords: existence; Gareth Evans; FregeKripke; make‐believe; proper names; reference

Chapter.  16936 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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