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Concepts as central theoretical constructs in cognitive science. Theories of concepts and theories of concept possession. Representational. The place of concepts in `representational theories of mind’. Basic assumptions of the discussion to follow: Psychological explanations are typically nomic; mental representations are the primitive bearers of intentional content; concepts are the constituents of propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires; thinking is computing; meaning is information; concepts are the typical proximal causes of behavior. Concepts as `Modes of Presentation of objects and properties’.
Keywords: cognitive science; concept possession; concepts; content; intentionality; propositional attitudes; psychological explanation; representation; thinking
Chapter. 10388 words.
Subjects: Philosophy of Mind
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