Sensations and Brain‐Events

Richard Swinburne

in The Evolution of the Soul

Published in print February 1997 | ISBN: 9780198236986
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598593 | DOI:
Sensations and Brain‐Events

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If we are to give a full history of the world, we need to count two properties as distinct, if possession of one does not entail possession of the other. Hence, mental properties are distinct from physical properties, and so mental events including sensations are distinct from physical events. So functionalism is rejected. And (New Appendix A shows) mental events do not supervene on, are not constituted by, or realized in, physical events

Keywords: Davidson; functionalism; Kim; mental event; property; sensation; supervenience

Chapter.  7288 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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