Chapter

Indexical Belief

Robert C. Stalnaker

in Context and Content

Published in print April 1999 | ISBN: 9780198237075
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598456 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198237073.003.0008

Series: Oxford Cognitive Science Series

Indexical Belief

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A puzzle about indexical or self‐locating belief is discussed. It is argued that with the help of the apparatus of propositional concepts and diagonal propositions developed in ch. 4 (’Assertion’) and 6 (Semantics for belief’), the phenomena can be reconciled with the doctrine of propositions—the thesis that the objects of belief are impersonal and timeless propositions. Alternative accounts of indexical belief, proposed by John Perry and by David Lewis are criticized.

Keywords: belief; diagonal proposition; indexical; David Lewis; John Perry; proposition; propositional concept

Chapter.  9540 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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