Chapter

Indeterminism and Antirealism

Donald Davidson

in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective

Published in print September 2001 | ISBN: 9780198237532
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597312 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198237537.003.0005

Series: The Philosophical Essays of Donald Davidson (5 Volumes)

Indeterminism and Antirealism

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Gives an insight into the richness of Davidson's contributions to the realism–anti‐realism debate, here with regards to the factuality of propositional‐attitude talk. Davidson argues that anti‐realism is best understood in epistemological terms, as a stance that commits ontologically in the light of what can be known. He concludes that, generally, one should not have anti‐realist attitudes as understood here towards propositional attitudes and, in particular, argues that one does not have to give up belief in first‐person authority, even if one accepts Quine's indeterminacy thesis.

Keywords: anti‐realism; epistemology; factuality of propositional‐attitude talk; first‐person authority; indeterminacy thesis; ontological commitment; propositional attitudes; Quine; realism–anti‐realism debate

Chapter.  6748 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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