Chapter

A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge

Donald Davidson

in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective

Published in print September 2001 | ISBN: 9780198237532
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597312 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198237537.003.0010

Series: The Philosophical Essays of Donald Davidson (5 Volumes)

A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge

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In this chapter, a set of replies to Richard Rorty's then‐pragmatist criticisms, Davidson defends a coherence theory of truth that is not incompatible but in fact yields a correspondence theory. He argues that the common ground for the theories are considerations of meaning and the objective truth‐conditions that state when meanings are given. Coherence, then, is supposed to be a test for both truth and the judgement that objective truth‐conditions are justified, yielding what Davidson calls a ‘non‐confrontational’ correspondence and a realist stance in all departments involved.

Keywords: coherence; correspondence; knowledge; meaning; ‘non‐confrontational’ correspondence; objective truth‐conditions; pragmatism; realism; Richard Rorty; truth

Chapter.  9169 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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