Chapter

Deception and Division

Donald Davidson

in Problems of Rationality

Published in print March 2004 | ISBN: 9780198237549
Published online August 2004 | e-ISBN: 9780191601378 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198237545.003.0013
Deception and Division

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Continues the theme of the preceding chapters, examining further the possibility of irrational thought and action, judged against a background that stipulates large‐scale rationality as a necessary condition for both interpretability and possession of a mind. Concentrates on the phenomenon of self‐deception, which the author holds to include ‘weakness of the warrant’, a phenomenon that violates what Hempel and Carnap have called ‘the requirement of total evidence for inductive reasoning’. The main tool to remove the paradox of self‐deception, according to the author, is the recognition of the idea that there can be boundaries between parts of the mind. Such boundaries, however, are not discovered by introspection, but are conceptual aids to the coherent description of genuine irrationalities.

Keywords: action; Carnap; Hempel; irrationality; mind; rationality; self‐deception; thought; warrant

Chapter.  6165 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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