Chapter

Thinking Causes

Donald Davidson

in Truth, Language, and History

Published in print February 2005 | ISBN: 9780198237570
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602610 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019823757X.003.0013
Thinking Causes

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This essay discusses a common criticism of the Davidson’s theory of Anomalous Monism, namely, that according to this theory the mental is causally inert. It is argued that this criticism stems from a misunderstanding of the use of the concept of supervenience, which implies ontological monism, but not definitional or nomological reductionism. The criticism also fails to appreciate that causal relations are extensional relations which hold between singular events no matter how they are described.

Keywords: theory of anomalous monism; mental; physical; supervenience

Chapter.  7034 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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