Chapter

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience

Gilbert Harman

in Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind

Published in print July 1999 | ISBN: 9780198238027
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597633 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198238029.003.0015
 The Intrinsic Quality of Experience

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Replies to three related arguments against wide functionalism. The first says that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and points out that there is no way to account for such an awareness in a purely functional view. The second claims that a person blind from birth can know all about the functional role of visual experience without knowing what it is like to see something red. The third holds that functionalism cannot account for the possibility of an inverted spectrum. All three arguments can be defused by distinguishing properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object.

Keywords: colour; functionalism; intrinsic quality; inverted spectrum; object of experiences; subjective experience

Chapter.  8266 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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