Chapter

Moral Relativism Defended

Gilbert Harman

in Explaining Value

Published in print August 2000 | ISBN: 9780198238041
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597626 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198238045.003.0001
 Moral Relativism Defended

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A version of moral relativism can be formulated as an intelligible thesis, the thesis that morality derives from an implicit agreement and moral judgements are true or false only in relation to such an agreement. This thesis explains otherwise puzzling aspects of some of our own moral views, in particular, why we think that it is more important to avoid harm to others than to help others avoid harm. Traditional objections to implicit agreement theories can be met.

Keywords: harming others; helping others; implicit agreement; moral judgement; moral relativism

Chapter.  7721 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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