Chapter

Desired Desires

Gilbert Harman

in Explaining Value

Published in print August 2000 | ISBN: 9780198238041
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597626 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198238045.003.0007
 Desired Desires

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Argues against appeals to second‐order desires in order to explain freedom of the will, valuing, or values. Further points are that positive intentions are reflexive or self‐referential, that intrinsic desires are not just non‐instrumental desires, that to value something is in part to want it, that there is sometimes a difference between believing that something is good and valuing it, and that there is a difference between valuing something and having something as one of your values.

Keywords: freedom; intrinsic desires; second‐order desires; valuing, values

Chapter.  8583 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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