Chapter

The Framework

Alvin I. Goldman

in Knowledge in a Social World

Published in print January 1999 | ISBN: 9780198238201
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597527 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198238207.003.0003
 The Framework

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From a veritistic standpoint, true belief is better than either ignorance or error, and higher degrees of belief in truths are better than lower degrees of belief, at least on topics of interest. These sorts of states have “fundamental” veritistic value (in varying degrees), and practices that produce changes in veritistically valuable states have “instrumental” veritistic value (V‐value). Veritistic social epistemology evaluates actual and possible social practices in terms of instrumental V‐value. This conception is preferable to rivals such as consensus consequentialism, utility consequentialism, and pure proceduralism. The feasibility of veritistic analysis is defended, worries about circularity are allayed, and various technical details are explored.

Keywords: circularity; consequentialism; degrees of belief; procedurism; veritistic value

Chapter.  16092 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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