Chapter

Truth, Content, and the Epistemic

Christopher Peacocke

in Being Known

Published in print March 1999 | ISBN: 9780198238607
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598197 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198238606.003.0002
 Truth, Content, and the Epistemic

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Some concepts can be individuated partly or wholly in terms of the conditions for knowing certain contents containing those concepts (‘the Linking Thesis’). For these concepts, the conditions for outright judgement mentioned in their possession conditions suffice both for the truth of the contents in question and for the knowledge of those contents. Proper analysis of these conditions provides a means of meeting the Integration Challenge in cases in which the Linking Thesis holds. The model of constitutive causal sensitivity and the model of implicitly known principles are distinguished. Indicators of which model is appropriate for a given domain include a priori status, the role of causal explanation of knowledgeable judgement about the domain, and the role of principles concerning the identity of properties.

Keywords: a priori; causal sensitivity; concepts; counterfactuals; implicit; Integration Challenge; possession conditions; tacit knowledge; truth conditions

Chapter.  17622 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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